A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers' strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative matching, which is efficient and consistent with the stable (cooperative equilibrium) outcome. This provides a non-cooperative and decentralized solution for the Assignment Game. Conversely, if buyers are identical, no such coordination is possible, and there is a continuum of equilibria, one of which exhibits price posting, another yields competition in auctions.
Introduction
This article considers equilibrium decentralized trade where sellers hold differentiated goods and buyers have idiosynchratic preferences. The Walrasian equivalent of allocating heterogeneous buyers and sellers is solved in what is known as the assignment game (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a survey). Assuming the preferences are common knowledge, this literature identifies equilibrium trading prices and allocations which describe an equilibrium.
1 In many contexts of trade however, prices are much more instrumental in the allocation process. Rather than the mere outcome of an optimization process, price is very often the strategic variable. Differentiated goods for example are commonly advertised by announcing the price in addition to the characteristics of the good. Many job announcements in newspapers, or through agencies, include a wage together with the job description. We therefore adopt the directed search approach (Montgomery (1991) , Peters (1991) , Acemoglu and Shimer (1998) , Burdett, Shi and Wright (1998) ). One side of the market, the sellers, publicly advertise their goods, their location and their price(s). The other side, the buyers, then choose which seller to visit. The central theme in the existing directed search literature is the inefficiency of the equilibrium allocation: buyers do not manage to coordinate their visit strategies. The question this paper addresses is whether sellers are able to solve the coordination problem and whether they can implement efficient allocations. For that purpose, we add two features. 1. Rather than restrict sellers' strategies to posting prices, sellers here are allowed to compete in direct mechanisms.
For example they could advertise an auction. The issue we investigate is what mechanisms these competing sellers adopt in equilibrium, and whether the final outcome is efficient. 2. We introduce two-sided heterogeneity, which makes our model isomorphic to the assignment game model. Will the decentralized trade model of the assignment game efficiently allocate differentiated buyers and sellers?
Our central result is that buyer heterogeneity and seller competition in mechanisms results in perfectly directed search, which is efficient. This result is surprising because the set of equilibria is discontinuous in buyer valuations: minimally different buyer valuations are sufficient for ruling out bad coordination equilibria, while 1 The so-called "stable" outcome has been shown to coincide with the Walrasian equilibrium.
coordination failure cannot be ruled out for identical buyers. Further, if there is also seller heterogeneity and supermodularity in the match value function, equilibrium results in the unique optimal allocation. The directed search model with competing mechanisms provides a decentralized solution for the assignment game.
Heterogeneity is critical for these results. With identical buyers, there exists a coordination problem where no buyer knows which seller the other buyers will visit, so the buyers' visiting strategy is to randomize over sellers. As there is a positive probability that several buyers will choose the same seller, the final outcome is inefficient: goods remain unsold with positive probability. We show that with buyer heterogeneity, each seller's mechanism is allocationally efficient [it allocates the good to the highest valuation buyer should more than one show]: ex post, buyers who enter the mechanism truthfully reveal their type. The byproduct of truthful revelation is that it allows sellers to announce sufficiently rich mechanisms ex ante. Because sellers know the buyers will truthfully reveal their types, they can choose the mechanism's incentive compatible payoffs in order to affect buyers visit strategy. This perfectly directs buyers to the appropriate sellers and solves the coordination problem.
This paper extends the recent directed search literature in two ways. It assumes there is two sided heterogeneity in the market and that sellers compete by advertising prices/mechanisms. Much of the directed search literature has instead assumed no or one-sided heterogeneity, where the advertisers post a price, and the (identical) searchers choose which advertiser to visit [e.g. Montgomery (1991) , Peters (1991) , Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) , Burdett et al (1998) ]. This generates the coordination failure mentioned above, as identical searchers do not know which advertiser each will choose to visit. 2 When the advertisers are heterogeneous, coordination failure remains while price dispersion arises as an equilibrium outcome [Montgomery (1991) ].
Otherwise, all advertisers post the same price.
Of course, when buyers are heterogeneous, posting a single price cannot be an optimal mechanism. If several buyers visit the same seller, maximising joint surplus requires allocating the good to the buyer who values it most. McAfee (1993), Peters (1997), Peters and Severinov (1997) , Burguet and Sakovics (1999) , Coles (1999) show that when buyers have independent private values, then in equilibrium sellers advertise second price sealed bid auctions and compete on reserve price.
In this article, it is not assumed that buyers have independent private values. Instead, as in the assignment game literature, there is a finite number of buyers where the distribution of preferences is common knowledge. Each buyer knows his own preference type, but that knowledge is private information: buyers are anonymous.
It is precisely this type of buyer preferences that generate the coordination result.
When two buyers turn up at one seller, the seller knows that they have different valuations. The efficient mechanism will always allocate the good to the high valuation buyer. In addition, it will generate coordination as in equilibrium, no two buyers will ever turn up at the same seller. In the announcement stage of the mechanism, the seller can choose the transfers such that only one of the two buyers wants to visit her. If one seller announces terms of trade that attract one buyer, the best response of the other firm is to attract the other buyer. The common value assumption about the preferences that drives the coordination result is a crucial feature of the directed search and assignment game literature. Though absent in most of the optimal competing mechanism literature, recent work by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (1999) and Maskin (1999) introduces a common value environment.
This common value feature of preferences is of course widely adopted in the common agency literature (see Whinston (1986a and 1986b ), Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) and Bergemann and Välimäki (1999) ). Common agency is a multilateral relationship in which several principals simultaneously try to influence the actions of one agent. Though the model we present is fundamentally different, several aspects are common to the models in that literature. We have two principals (the sellers) who simultaneously try to induce two agents (the buyers) to participate in their mechanism. Moreover, the point of departure in the common agency literature, as well as in our model, is the use of Groves-Clarke mechanisms: truthtelling is a dominant strategy. It is then no surprise that even though the mechanisms in our model can coordinate the actions of the buyers, there exist multiple equilibrium transfer prices. These are the result of "non-serious" announcements by sellers even though these announcements do not change the equilibrium allocation. This has led Bernheim and Whinston to concentrate on the refinement called truthful equilibrium. A strategy is truthful relative to a given action by the buyers (agents) if it accurately reflects the seller's (the principal) willingness to pay for any other action relative to the given action. We show that a truthful equilibrium yields a unique set of equilibrium prices for the coordinated equilibrium. If the match value function is supermodular, the truthful equilibrium allocation is also unique. This corresponds to the centralized solution of the assignment game, which exhibits postitive assortative matching.
Most of the paper focusses on the two by two case. After describing the framework, section 3 shows there is a continuum of (perfect) Nash equilibria when buyers (and sellers) are identical. Those equilibria are characterized by coordination failure: buyers randomise their visiting strategy. The continuum of bad coordination equilibria is new to the directed search literature. Section 4 then assumes buyers are heterogeneous. The equilibrium seller mechanisms perfectly coordinate the visit strategies of buyers. That implies that the allocation is always efficient. Truthful equilibrium also yields a set of unique prices. Section 5 then considers heterogeneity of both buyers and sellers and shows that for a matching value function strictly supermodular, the allocation is unique. That equilibrium implies positive assortative matching and payoffs which are consistent with a stable outcome. This result is then generalised to the N × N case in section 6.
The Directed Search Model
There are two buyers and two sellers. Each seller has one unit of an indivisible good for sale, and each buyer wishes to purchase one unit. The buyers and sellers are heterogeneous, indexed by a type x ∈ X = {1, 2} for buyers and y ∈ Y = {1, 2} for sellers. For any matched pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y, the utility generated is denoted by the match value Q : X × Y → . Although X , Y and Q are common knowledge, buyers are anonymous.
Prices and the allocation of goods are determined by competition in seller mechanisms. In the first stage of the game, the sellers simultaneously post advertisements which describe their good (i.e. describe their type y) and a price/allocation mechanism. Each seller posts a direct mechanism -each visiting buyer (if any) simultaneously sends a message m ∈ X to the seller, and conditional on those messages, the mechanism determines who gets the good and any sidepayments. Only equilibria with pure seller strategies are considered.
In the second stage of the game, each buyer visits at most one seller. In particular,
given the advertized 'mechanisms', buyers simultaneously choose which seller to visit.
Given those decisions, and prior to the mechanism being played, each buyer observes whether the other buyer has made the same choice or not. At this stage a buyer can choose to walk away and so realize a payoff of zero. Given any buyers who remain, the seller's advertised mechanism is then played and determines the final payoffs; i.e.
the good is allocated and all sidepayments are made.
All buyers and sellers are risk neutral, expected utility maximizers. If buyer x consumes good y and pays price p, the buyer obtains utility Q(x, y) − p and the seller obtains payoff p from the transaction. The seller obtains zero utility by consuming his own good.
The first step is to consider a simple benchmark case -that all buyers and all sellers are identical.
3 The Benchmark Case: Identical Buyers, Identi-
cal Sellers
Assume Q(x, y) = Q for all x, y. As the distribution of buyer types is degenerate, the restriction to direct mechanisms implies both buyers obtain the same payoff if they visit the same seller. Suppose both buyers visit the same seller y and their equilibrium expected payoff is u. As each has the option to walk away, this expected payoff satisfies u ≥ 0. But note all are risk neutral. The seller's optimal direct mechanism simply sells the good with probability one, while providing each buyer with expected payoff u (this maximises joint surplus and so maximises seller profit).
One such mechanism chooses either buyer with equal probability and sells the good at price p where u = describe a Nash equilibrium in pricing strategies for the two sellers. 3 Julien, Kennes and King (1998) consider a hybrid case, where in a prior stage, each seller simultaneously commits to using either an auction or a fixed price. 4 If p 2 > Q and p 1 ≤ Q then the buyers will play a war of attrition -each wants the other to walk away. Suppose each walks away with probability π and their corresponding expected payoff is u ≥ 0. It follows that posting p 2 where u =
Both buyers obtain the same expected payoff, but the total surplus generated increases as the good is sold with probability one (rather than probability (1 − π) 2 ≤ 1). 5 The next section assumes heterogeneous buyers where buyers use different strategies. Equilibrium finds that buyers use pure visit strategies and visit different sellers. This section assumes identical buyers cannot co-ordinate in this way. Nonetheless, those results also apply to the case of identical buyers by setting There is a continuum of equilibria, one of which involves price posting [
and one of which involves posting an auction [
The rest of this section formally establishes this result using standard backward induction arguments. Anticipating that Nash equilibria where σ = 0, 1 do not exist (one seller would then make zero expected profit and a profitable deviation always exists), we first compute σ assuming mixing by buyers.
Proof. An interior solution to σ requires buyer 1 is indifferent between visiting either seller. This requires
where the left hand side is buyer 1's expected payoff to visiting seller 1 given σ 2 is the probability that buyer 2 also visits seller 1. Solving for σ 2 and noting that symmetry requires σ 2 = σ implies (1).
Note that if σ has an interior solution, Lemma (3) implies that both buyers use the same strategy σ 1 = σ 2 = σ. This follows from the fact that the mixed strategy requires them to be indifferent between both sellers. This is only true for identical buyers if both use the same strategy. Now if seller 1 announces (p 1 , p 2 ) and σ is the visit probability of each buyer, then seller 1's expected payoff is
where 2σ(1 − σ) is the probability one buyer shows (and trade occurs at price p 1 ) and σ 2 is the probability that two buyers show.
We now construct seller 1's best response function. Suppose seller 2's strategy is
. Further suppose that seller 1 announces (p 1 , p 2 ) and σ ∈ (0, 1) in the resulting subgame. As Lemma 1 implies a unique solution for σ in this case, we can use (1) to substitute out p 2 in (2) and so obtain a reduced form profit function π for seller 1
which holds for all σ ∈ (0, 1). Note the surprising result -although we only substituted out p 2 using (1) in (2) 
Lemma 4 Given
Proof. In Appendix.
The same argument describes σ * 2 . Identifying a perfect Nash equilibrium requires finding a σ ∈ [0, 1] where σ * 1 = σ * 2 = σ (so that both sellers are playing best responses). It immediately follows that if a perfect Nash equilibrium exists, it implies σ ∈ (0, 1).
and the inequalities
describes a perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Lemma (4a) implies that seller 1 is playing a best response if (4) and inequalities (6) hold, where it should be noted that those inequalities guarantee
The same argument applies to seller 2, where (5) describes the best response of seller 2 if inequalities (7) hold. As (1) describes the buyers' optimal strategies in the subgame (given σ ∈ (0, 1) in an equilibrium), any solution to these conditions describes a perfect Nash equilibrium.
6 If σ = 0, then σ * 1 = 0 implies that seller 2 must announce p 2 ≤ −Q [see Figure ? ?]. As seller 2 then gets both buyers, she makes a strict loss and this cannot be an optimal strategy.
There is a continuum of equilibria as we only have 3 equations (1), (4), (5) and (4), (5) imply
. But p 2 and p 2 are not tied down. As the inequalities are satisfied for p 2 = p 2 = α where α ∈ (−Q, Q], symmetric equilibria exist for those values.
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This continuum arises because each seller has a continuum of best responses. In any equilibrium (which implies some value of σ ∈ (0, 1)), any (p 1 , p 2 ) satisfying (1) describes a best response for seller 1. But changing (p 1 , p 2 ) while holding σ constant changes the elasticities of σ with respect to p 1 , p 2 . This in turn changes firm 2's best response correspondence. A continuum of 'best response intersections' are possible (as described by lemma 3).
In the symmetric equilibria, if seller 2 offers more surplus to the buyers, say by lowering p 2 , seller 1's best response is to offer more surplus to remain competitive.
Indeed, a best response of seller 1 is to lower p 2 by exactly the same amount, and so a continuum of equilibria are possible.
Lemma (5) . Note that this equilibrium is less efficient than the symmetric equilibrium as the probability that one buyer does not obtain a good has increased. Indeed this is true for all asymmetric equilibria as they necessarily imply σ = 0.5.
Heterogeneous Buyers
The continuum result of the previous section is new to the literature. But it also confirms the main existing result on directed search with identical buyers: sellers are unable to coordinate identical buyers' visit strategies and as a result the equilibrium 7 By inspection of lemma (5c), it follows that p 1 = p 1 = Q 2 and p 2 = p 2 = −Q also describes an equilibrium. This is the zero profit equilibrium. 
An Optimal Direct Mechanism
A direct mechanism corresponds to a message game Γ (X × X , u (·)), where each participant sends a message m x ∈ X = {L, H}, and conditional only on those messages, an allocation rule and sidepayments implies an outcome function u (·) :
Suppose the seller wishes to construct a direct mechanism which implements expected payoffs u L , u H ≥ 0 to the respective buyers, should both arrive. Obviously such a mechanism needs to be incentive compatible. But clearly we should be most interested in an efficient direct mechanism -one that allocates the good to the highest valuation buyer. If such a mechanism exists, it must be optimal as by maximising joint surplus, it then maximises the payoff to the seller [given the advertised payoffs
The following establishes that such a direct mechanism always exists, for any
below describe a set of (anonymous) allocation rules which induce truth-telling as an iterated dominant strategy equilibrium and
(A1) If both buyers report m x = H, the seller gives each buyer sidepayment u L and allocates the good with equal probability at a price p = 1 2
(A2) If both buyers report message m x = L, the good is not sold and both buyers obtain a payoff of zero.
(A3) If one buyer reports H, the other L, the seller allocates the good to the buyer reporting H at price p = Q H − u H and pays u L to the buyer reporting L.
These allocation rules imply a message game with the following normal form
[where buyer H plays rows (and receives the first number in the pay-off pair) and
Although these allocation rules respect anonymity, they do not imply symmetric payoffs as the buyers obtain different payoffs by consuming the good.
Allocation rules (A1)-(A3) imply that truth telling is incentive compatible. As rule (A3) allocates the good to the high valuation buyer, this mechanism also maximises 8 All equilibria described below imply u H > 0. Of course, u H = 0 implies only weak dominance.
joint surplus. Further as rule (A3) also implements the (given) payoffs u H , u L ≥ 0, this mechanism also maximises the seller's own surplus. Hence given any u H , u L ≥ 0, these allocation rules describe an optimal direct mechanism and the seller's corresponding
From now on assume that both sellers use a direct mechanism of this form and as a result, the only payoff relevant variables when two buyers turn up are the seller's advertised choice of u H and u L .
A Nash Equilibrium in Seller Mechanisms
The previous subsection implies the seller's optimal direct mechanism reduces to a But equilibrium is now quite different. To see why, suppose for now that the
A little work shows that in any mixed strategy
and seller 1's payoff function is
Following the previous approach, suppose σ L , σ H ∈ (0, 1) and so use (8) and (9) 
But now there is a crucial difference. Previously, visiting strategies for buyers with identical valuations were identical (from Lemma 3); i.e. σ L = σ H = σ. This also follows immediately from insepction of (8) and (9) for equal valuations Q and equal transfers u. It followed that the profit function (3) was then concave in σ (at the equilibrium). But with heterogeneous buyers, the payoff function described by (10) is not concave in σ L , σ H . This is a striking difference. When buyers have different preferences, the seller's optimal separating mechanism not only allocates the good efficiently (should both buyers visit), but also co-ordinates the visit strategies of buyers -there is no randomization by buyers in equilibrium.
Characterising the set of perfect Nash equilibria requires a different approach. 
2's best response. The following Lemma identifies necessary and sufficient conditions 0) is a best response, and (ii) seller 1 makes strictly positive profits, are
Further, given (R1) − (R3), seller 1's best pricing response is
Given seller 2's strategy satisfies (R1) − (R3), seller 1's best response induces (σ H , σ L ) = (1, 0). In particular, note that price strategy
where ε > 0 (but small) implies buyer H s strict dominant strategy is to visit seller Similar conditions also describe (σ H , σ L ), the best response of seller 2.
Lemma 8 Necessary and sufficient conditions on
(1, 0) is a best response and (ii) seller 2 makes strictly positive profits, are
Given (R1 ) − (R3 ), seller 2's best pricing response is
If seller 1 plays tough [i.e. (R2 ) holds] and announces a sufficiently low price p 1
[satisfying (R3 )] then seller 2's best response is to attract buyer L using the above price strategy. Using Lemmas 7 and 8, it is now straightforward to describe perfect Nash equilibria with (σ H , σ L ) = (1, 0). The main feature is that there is a continuum of such equilibria. We illustrate this with an example. An equilibrium with (σ H , σ L ) = (1, 0) exists where seller 1 posts
As this price strategy satisfies (R1 ) − (R3 ), then seller 2's best response implies Lemma 8) . Note that the extravagant sideoffers of seller 1 force seller 2 to offer a very low price. But also note seller 1 has chosen p 1 small enough to ensure seller 2 does not poach both buyers (i.e. to satisfy (R3 )).
Of course seller 1's strategy also has to be a best response. Lemma 7 requires
Hence as long as u L is large enough (i.e. seller 2 plays "weak"), then the above strategy for seller 1 and
describe a perfect Nash equilibrium with (σ H , σ L ) = (1, 0).
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This example reveals the source of multiplicity -the sideoffers determine the equilibrium prices p 1 , p 1 , but the sideoffers themselves are not determined. In particular given (R1) − (R3), seller 1's best response is only
Seller 1 has a unique optimal choice for p 1 , but the optimal choice of sideoffers requires only that u L is sufficiently low that he does not attract both buyers. In contrast, This source of multiplicity is well known in the game theory literature and the concept of trembling hand perfection is typically used as the appropriate equilibrium refinement [for example see the Bertand pricing game as described in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1994)]. 13 In an uncertain world, if there is a small (vanishing) probability that buyer L will deviate (i.e. a tremble is possible), then generous sideoffers are strictly profit reducing; there is a small but positive probability that both 12 Note that though sellers are identical, they do not necessarily receive the same profits as we have not imposed symmetric pricing strategies. 13 The relevant Bertrand pricing game has two sellers who have different unit costs 0 < c L < c H , and both announce a price simultaneously. With the right tie breaking assumption to guarantee buyers will visit. However, as Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) argue, formalizing this notion imposes severe difficulties. Rather than complicating the analysis, we borrow the refinement adopted in the common agency literature: truthful equilibrium. This requires that side-offers are serious. Relative to an action that involves sideoffers u L , u H ≥ 0, the seller's profit is required not to be lower should the seller succeed in attracting both buyers.
is truthful if and only if it is a
Nash equilibrium and the strategies are truthful:
The restriction to no frivolous offers uniquely determines equilibrium payoffs.
Theorem 10 (Heterogeneous Buyers) Strictly positive profit, perfect Nash equilibria with (σ H , σ L ) = (1, 0) and (T1)-(T2) exist and imply
With no frivolous sideoffers, equilibrium implies both sellers post second price sealed bid auctions with reserve price Q L , and both obtain the same profit Q L . Clearly this outcome does not resolve the coordination problem. The restriction to no frivolous offers implies neither seller plays strictly tough, nor strictly weak. Indeed, the same strategies correspond to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with σ L = 1, σ H = 0.
14 existence, (i.e. that if a customer is indifferent she goes to the lower cost firm), then there is a continuum of Nash equilibria; both sellers announce the same price
and all customers go to seller L. Selten's trembling-hand argument rules out all equilibria except p = c H . But note that in this surviving equilibrium, if the buyers deviate and visit the high cost seller, that seller's profit is no less than equilibrium profit. This is not true for the eliminated equilibria with p < c H . In this case, restrictions of the form (N F 1), (N F 2) described below play the same role as trembling hand perfection. 14 The formal difference being in assumed tie breaking assumptions -see footnote 9.
Further, a third equilibrium seems likely where sellers randomize on prices [e.g. Burguet and Sakovics (1999)]. However seller heterogeneity now resolves this final coordination problem.
Heterogeneous Buyers, Heterogeneous Sellers
This time denote
where the first superscript refers to the buyer, the second to the seller. to index the respective buyers, but to limit confusion over notation use y ∈ {1, 2} to index the sellers, where seller 1 has the more valuable good.
Throughout assume
We again construct perfect Nash equilibrium but assuming (11) and strategies must be truthful. Theorems (11) and (12) As before only consider strictly positive profit equilibria, where a little work establishes that in a pure strategy pricing equilibrium, the visit strategies imply
The intuition is as before -each seller's best response coordinates the visit strategies of each buyer. Also, only consider non-frivolous side-offers which
where the interpretation is the same as before.
Theorem 11 Given (11) and (T3),(T4), a Nash equilibrium with
exists and implies
This result is closely related to that described in Theorem 10. No frivolous sideoffers implies seller 2 extracts all the rents from the low valuation buyer. But seller 2 also competes for buyer H by offering surplus u H = Q HL − Q LL . Indeed, seller 2's equilibrium mechanism corresponds to a second price sealed bid auction with reserve price Q LL . Such competition then forces seller 1 to set p 1 as described in the Theorem (to attract buyer H). The restriction to non-frivolous offers implies the equilibrium mechanisms are uniquely determined.
However, unlike Theorem 10, the seller strategies described in Theorem 11 are strictly coordinated. With heterogeneous sellers, the relevant coordination condition
Given (R2), seller 1 prefers to attract buyer H rather than buyer L. But Theorem
, and (11) implies this is a strictly "play weak"
strategy. Hence when seller 2 competes with a second priced sealed bid auction, seller 1 strictly prefers to attract buyer H.
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Theorem (12) establishes uniqueness, that an equilibrium with negative assortative matching (and no frivolous offers) does not exist.
Theorem 12 Given (11) and (T3),(T4), a Nash equilibrium with σ
does not exist.
Together Theorems (11) and (12) imply that (11) perfectly coordinates the sellers' strategies. In the unique equilibrium, seller 2 plays strictly weak. The sellers' corresponding pricing strategies then perfectly direct the buyers' search strategies and implies positive assortative matching. The final section now extends this result to the N seller, N buyer case.
The N × N Case
Clearly this case is much more complicated. We simply describe a candidate equilibrium using the insights provided by Theorem (11) and then prove that it does indeed describe a (perfect) Nash equilibrium. 
Each seller j simultaneously advertises a direct mechanism. Given those advertisements, each buyer simultaneously chooses which seller to visit. Let σ ij denote the probability that buyer i visits seller j. As before we wish to find a perfect Nash equilibrium to this mechanism game.
Let u * i denote the equilibrium payoff to buyer i and π * j the equilibrium payoff to seller j in a perfect equilibrium. We suppose positive assortative matching describes the final equilibrium outcome; that σ ii = 1 for all i. This implies that equilibrium payoffs satisfy
The 2 × 2 case suggests that payoffs might be determined by competition in second price sealed bid auctions; that is 
where seller i is just indifferent to attracting this buyer. For existence of equilibrium we invoke the following tie breaking assumption : if buyer i+1 is indifferent to visiting seller i + 1 or i then she chooses to visit seller i + 1.
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Given starting value u * 1 = 0, the candidate equilibrium payoffs are now defined recursively by (12) 
Given these candidate equilibrium payoffs, we now construct the equilibrium direct mechanisms.
As each seller receives exactly one visitor in equilibrium, then this candidate equilibrium requires each seller j specifies trading price p j = π * j if one buyer shows. If two buyers show, seller j uses the direct mechanism described earlier. In particular, the two buyers are asked to report m ∈ {L, H}, and allocations and prices are as described in that section, but with
. Note this mechanism is consistent with the two buyers being i = j, j + 1. If the message pair is (L, H) the good is sold to the buyer reporting H at the same price p j as when only one buyer shows. 17 Conversely if the message pair is (H, H) the good is randomly allocated at price Proof : Clearly σ ii = 1 describes a Nash equilibrium in visit strategies, given the posted mechanisms. If any buyer i deviates by visiting any seller j = i, the direct mechanism [given at least two buyers visit] implies she can obtain the good at a price 17 The allocation rules specify that the buyer reporting H receives the good at price
. Equation (13) implies this price equals π * j which is p j .
no lower than π * j and as these prices are consistent with a stable outcome, such a deviation cannot make her better off. Now consider the optimal direct mechanism of seller k, given all other sellers j = k post the direct mechanisms as described above. In particular, suppose seller k deviates by posting p k > π * k ; she raises her price in the event of only one buyer showing. Then regardless of whatever else she specifies in her mechanism, the corresponding Nash In particular, given this (co-ordinated) subgame response by buyers, each buyer i is guaranteed a payoff of at least u * i . Hence to attract at least one buyer with positive probability, seller k must offer p k ≤ π * k and a mechanism which offers an expected payoff of at least u * i for some buyer i. But as these payoffs describe a stable outcome, an optimal mechanism is to attract buyer k and sell at price p k = π * k . Hence the stated mechanism is an optimal strategy and we have a (perfect) Nash equilibrium.
Conclusion
With a finite number of buyers and sellers, buyer heterogeneity and equilibrium in pure pricing strategies implies buyer search is perfectly directed. But if sellers are identical, they face a second problem -who will play tough and who will play weak?
The Burdett and Coles (1999) shows this creates a sorting externality: when two agents trade and exit the market, they do not take into account that they change the composition of the market, which then affects the trading opportunities of the remaining buyers and sellers. But allowing only one-sided heterogeneity removes this sorting externality. Moen (1996) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1998) show that trade with random matching is constrained efficient. Constrained, because even though the search decisions are efficiently directed, there is still friction. We show that for small markets of heterogeneous buyers and with appropriate seller mechanisms, even the search inefficiency as a result of coordination failure disappears.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 5
Throughout assume (p 1 , p 2 ) fixed. The text has described those pricing strategies (p 1 , p 2 ) which generate mixed visit strategies and corresponding payoffs. But we must also consider those pricing strategies which generate pure visit strategies. (ii) (R1) − (R3) are sufficient.
By multiplying both sides by σ H , the conditions determining σ H described above imply :
Similarly, the conditions determining σ L imply
There are three cases depending on the seller's choice of p 1 .
(a) Price strategies where p 1 ≤ Q L . In this case, each buyer will purchase the good at price p 1 if only one buyer shows, and the seller's expected payoff is then
Using (14) , (15) to substitute out u L , u H and rearranging implies
Hence ( 
Using (14), (15) to substitute out u L , u H and rearranging implies 
Using (14), (15) to substitute out u L , u H and rearranging implies
This completes the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 8
There are two cases depending on whether 
Proof of Theorem 10
Any positive profit Nash equilibrium with (σ H , σ L ) = (1, 0) requires that both sellers are playing best responses. By lemmas 5,6 those best responses imply
Using (16) 
where u H , u L , u H , u L ≥ 0.
We also use (16) 
We now solve these conditions. Note (R2) and(R2 ) imply
With (17) 
We 
Direct inspection shows that these values satisfy all the above conditions, which completes the proof of the Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 11
As the structure of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 10 we only sketch details. First we must obtain the conditions analogous to lemmas 7 and 8. 
